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Abstract
This article offers an empirical answer to the question of which institutional
arrangements can help to keep the accounts of sub-national governments in bal-
ance. I take into consideration the autonomy that these governments have in
raising their revenues and fiscal rules as formulated in law or constitutions. The
former works as an implicit constraint since governments with more autonomy
might assume higher responsibility for accumulated deficits. The latter works as
a direct explicit constraint on sub-national borrowing, but might be subject to
endogeneity through preferences for fiscal responsibility. This potential source
of bias is taken into account by using IV techniques for fiscal rules. Results from
my original dataset, covering full information for 14 years of all EU15 countries,
show that the effectiveness of tools depends critically on the federal background.
Fiscal rules work in unitary countries, while higher tax autonomy yields lower
deficits in federations.
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1. Introduction
This paper tackles the questions of why the aggregated fiscal performance of sub-national
governments in European countries differs, and how this can be explained by different in-
stitutional settings, such as fiscal rules and autonomy over tax instruments.
Much research has been done since the early 1990s which dealt with the question of why
certain countries have experienced a large period of budget deficits that accumulate in high
levels of public debt while others did not. Attention was focused on political and insti-
tutional factors, since even countries with similar underlying economic conditions showed
a widespread variation in debt levels. It has been argued that to a large extent the de-
sign of institutions, which govern the budgetary process, are the underlying reason for the
cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal positions.
While much attention, both theoretical and empirical, has been spent on the central or
general budget and national fiscal policy, the link between sub-national debts and deficits,
their institutions, and in particular the restrictions imposed on them by fiscal rules, have
not yet been explored in depth. The institutional background in this context is different to
that of the central level because vertical relationships between the levels of government play
a crucial role. This paper aims at a closer empirical investigation of the underlying forces.
The differences in fiscal positions below the national level can be caused by a deficit bias
due to a common pool externality: budgetary inflows come to a certain extend in almost
all countries from a common source in the form of transfers or grants, while budgetary
outflows are targeted to specific regions or municipalities. To be precise, a substantial
share of revenues is generated with instruments that sub-national entities have no direct
discretion over. Putting this in a dynamic context, the budget constraints of governments
which are highly dependent on revenues that are not generated by their own instruments
might become soft. The respective decision maker on the sub-national level might expect
ex-ante, that if he causes a large and unsustainable deficit, the resulting outstanding debt
would have to be bailed out ex-post by a higher level of government. In other words, the
central government cannot credibly commit itself to a no-bailout policy, if the respective
lower level government has no power to solve fiscal problems on its own because instruments
to do so are not available once fiscal trouble has emerged. If instead a large proportion of
sub-national revenues comes from own tax resources, this might work as an implicit way of
the central government to communicate that sub-national entities should act on their own
behalf. In this case, they can be asked to implement adjustments by increasing tax rates
under their control. Low fiscal autonomy might therefore be connected to higher deficits,
since budget constraints are soft.
A recent attempt to mitigate this time inconsistency problem of soft budget constraints
was to impose fiscal rules on sub-national governments. The idea of fiscal rules is to force
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local or regional governments to act in a way the central level disires. The number of fiscal
frameworks which impose balanced budget or debt rules on lower governmental sectors
has increased over the last two decades. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact could be seen as the cornerstone in the interest of such
rules, which restrict governments in the way they should keep their books balanced. The
European Monetary Union creates a framework where one should keep a check on the fiscal
policy of member states to avoid negative externalities. In recent years a fierce increase in
the number of fiscal rules at the national level can be observed. The goal of these rules,
often called ”national stability pact”, could easily be jeopardized if the budgetary policies
of sub-national governments do not act in concert, hence making relationships between
different governmental levels important. Therefore, almost all of these national pacts impose
restrictions on lower level governments as well.
According to this, the driving forces behind sub-national deficits I explore in this paper
are twofold. On the one hand, I focus on the autonomy that these governments have in
raising their revenues. This autonomy might constrain sub-national sectors as a form of an
implicit rule, since higher autonomy goes along with higher own responsibility for results of
their fiscal policy. On the other hand, I also focus on explicit fiscal rules, as formulated in
law or constitutions, covering restrictions imposed on the sub-national sector to harden the
budget constraint.
I also analyze what drives countries to adopt, keep, or to strengthen their framework of
rules. This is an important task that helps to overcome a potential problem of endogeneity,
which is well known in this strand of literature. Stricter rules may be adopted by govern-
ments with stronger preferences for fiscal discipline or a severe need for consolidation. I
show that good instrumental variables for sub-national rules exist, which can help to solve
this potential endogeneity problem. The main reasoning of the paper in this dimension is
that political characteristics of the rule imposing level might be good instruments for the
rules themselves at the lower governmental level. They fulfill the exclusion restriction since
these political variables might have an impact on the fiscal outcome of the central level, but
not on the deficits of sub-national governments.
I derive my results from a panel-data set of the sub-national sectors of the EU15 countries,
covering data for fiscal rules, tax autonomy, and political and fiscal variables over the period
1995-2008. Regressions of measurements of the strictness of rules and the discretion to tax
on deficits of sub-national sectors show that the effectiveness of fiscal rules and the impact of
tax autonomy depend critically on the federal structure of the respective country. As a main
result, fiscal rules work in unitary countries and not in federations, but implicit restrictions
due to higher tax autonomy are an effective way to constrain excessive spending for the
federal countries in my sample.
This paper is organized as follows: the next section presents stylized facts over sub-
3
national public finances of the EU15 countries. Section three summarizes the underlying
theory and the related literature. The empirical analysis starts in section four with expla-
nation of my identification strategy. Section five presents my dataset, and my results are
shown and discussed in section six. The paper comes to a close in the last section.
2. Stylized facts
The structure of European countries differs in many respects. One of the most important
distinctions is the role and status of the sub-national sector. On the one hand, three countries
out of the EU15 are original federations as written down in the respective constitution
(Austria, Belgium, Germany), and another country (Spain) has a very regionalized structure.
All these countries have had handed over important responsibilities to the regional and local
level, and these sub-national governments have significant own legislative powers.
[Table 1 about here]
Therefore, I treat this group of countries as federations in my analysis. The other group
of countries consists of unitary countries, but those may have a different number of sub-
national levels. While Finland has only a local level sector, the remaining unitary countries
(Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom) have at least another regional level, but with limited autonomy,
compared to their federal counterparts. Hence, as indicated in table 1, I group all these
countries as unitary ones.
[Figure 1 about here]
European countries also differ substantially in the level of debt which they have accumulated
in the past. Figure 1 shows the level of outstanding debt in 2008 as a share of GDP in the top
panel. This indicates that a substantial part of the total debt in European countries is due to
sub-national borrowing. Most federal countries, and in particular Germany, show relatively
huge ratios of outstanding debt to GDP. However, this measure can be misleading, since it
does not take into account the actual size of the sub-national sector. Therefore, the bottom
panel depicts the outstanding debt as a share of revenues for the same year. Measures in
terms of revenues capture two important dimensions. First, they indicate the relevance of
debt in terms of the capacity to generate budgetary inflows. Second, this measures the size
of the sub-national sector as mentioned before.1 While the ranking for federal countries
remains largely the same, this illustrates the differences in unitary countries further. Even
though the Nordic countries have much larger sub-national sectors relative to the general
1The actual size might be also depicted in terms of expenditures, but note that the ordering of countries
does not change if I do so.
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government sector, their debt is lower compared to countries such as Portugal or France,
which are less decentralized.
Since debts are the accumulation of deficits over time, the paper aims at answering the
following questions. First, why did some federal countries, such as Germany, have on average
larger deficits than other federal countries? And second, what drives the pattern of deficits
over time in the unitary countries, even though the differences in decentralization have been
taken into account? To sum it up, I will explore why sub-national sectors in some countries
are exposed to a larger bias toward deficits than others.
3. Theoretical motivation and related empirical
literature
A well-established reasoning for differences in debts and deficits at any level of government
is that the respective members of the legislature do not fully internalize the costs of the
public goods they acquire. This is known as the common pool resource problem. Since
costs are shared by the whole population, theoretical models, as those of Velasco (2000),
Hallerberg et al. (2009), and Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2010), emphasize that these costs
are not fully internalized by the spending claims of individual spending ministers, in the
sub-national context by members of local or regional councils. This results in overspending,
since only a small part of the additional social costs of raising the tax burden are taken into
account, eventually creating a problem of 1/n. The more interest groups that are involved
in deciding the budget, the more fragmented the budget process becomes, and the higher
the deficit bias due to individual spending claims. This is a result of a horizontal externality
since it occurs within one government.
That point, applicable to every level of government, is supplemented by one that espe-
cially lets sub-national governments be inclined to overspend and borrow extensively. This
might occur because several sub-national entities are grabbing for resources out of a national
common pool. In this case the existence of soft budget constraints creates a vertical exter-
nality. Borgdignon (2006) provides a survey of this literature. When a budget constraint is
considered to be soft, a sub-national government can increase expenditures without facing
the full additional social costs. A hard budget constraint instead makes the entity internalize
the full additional social costs, since it expects to be responsible for the consequences of its
spending plans (Rodden et al., 2003). The underlying problem is of a dynamic nature: sub-
national governments can accumulate unsustainable debt levels if they expect ex-ante that
the central government might wish to bail them out once fiscal obligations can no longer be
fulfilled ex-post. In other words, sub-national governments might expect that under certain
circumstances the central government is responsible as a last resort for the liabilities they
accumulate. Thus, there is a link between expectations over the behavior of a higher gov-
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ernmental level in the future and the fiscal policy chosen at present. Among other factors,
one main channel of these expectations is intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The probability
that a sub-national entity is not responsible for its fiscal decisions taken today is higher, the
lower the share of own-source revenues is. In other words, the higher the dependency on
central governmental grants and transfers, the higher the expectation of a bail-out. This is
because the central level has less room to ask for adjustments in sub-national taxes in the
case of fiscal trouble, resulting in a dynamic game between the two actors.
This ’default-bailout game’ between the central and sub-national level is formalized by
Inman (2001) and Kornai et al. (2003). The center commits itself in the first stage to a
no-bailout policy. The sub-national level instead chooses to spend at a level where the local
marginal benefit is higher than the marginal social costs if it has a strong belief that the
commitment of the center in the first stage is not credible. Finally, the central government
has to decide whether to provide additional transfers to the lower level in order to reduce
the deficit there. If the center has strong incentives to do so, its actions will be antici-
pated by the lower level government. The budget constraint is the softer, the lower the
costs of the center to provide additional funds compared to leaving the sub-national govern-
ment alone with its deficits. Several papers formalized the problem in partial equilibrium
models in order to analyze the effects of different issues on the prevalence of soft budget
constraints (see Vigneault (2006) for an extensive overview over theoretical considerations).
The model of Goodspeed (2002) for example shows that a bail-out forced by incentives of
a lower level government to accumulate high debt has to be paid partially by other regions
through increased taxation. Furthermore, Wildasin (1997) focuses on the size and struc-
ture of jurisdictions, Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) on the impact of fiscal equalization schemes, and
Breuille´ et al. (2006) investigate the impact of horizontal and vertical tax competition. For
federal systems, Breuille´ and Vigneault (2010) have recently shown that the soft budget
problem can be worse in a multi-tier system if regional level governments have discretion
over transfer policies. In that case a soft budget constraint on the regional level yields even
softer budget constraints on the local level.
The theoretical interest over soft budget constraints in the context of fiscal federalism
has also triggered empirical contributions in this area. These studies focus either on cross-
country evidence over aggregated fiscal policy on the sub-national level, or country specific
case-studies. Rodden et al. (2003) provide a collection of mostly descriptive case studies.
Additional country specific evidence for sub-national bailouts is provided by von Hagen
et al. (2000) for German states, Italian regions, Australian and Swedish local jurisdictions.
National evidence for Sweden is found by Dahlberg and von Hagen (2004). They find that
the ability of the central Swedish government to commit to a no-bailout policy is rather
weak, while the high degree of tax autonomy at the local level helps to harden budget
constraints. A recent study by Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) identifies the expectations of
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local Swedish governments over a future discretionary grant by an instrumental variable
approach. He uses the grants received by neighboring municipalities as an instrument for
the anticipation of own additional future discretionary grants. A significant soft budget
effect is found, and on average debt is increased by 20 percent when the budget constraint
becomes soft. Apart from these studies, there is not much more empirical evidence at the
country level. The lack of empirical work can be explained by the fact that expectations
over the additional allocation of funds are not easy to measure, and as shown in the various
case studies, numerous aspects of intergovernmental relations can create this effect.
However, in order to solve the soft budget problem of time inconsistent behavior, coun-
tries characterized by little revenue raising power at sub-national levels might impose more
restrictions through fiscal rules on lower level governments in order to commit the local or
regional level to fiscal discipline. Indeed, von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) show that bor-
rowing limits are more prevalent in countries where the share of sub-central government’s
own-source resources is small. This is because if own taxes could be adjusted, the central
government could deny a bail-out. It has been also pointed out that these incentives might
be different according to the federal organization of countries.
Empirical contributions that are closely related to this paper perform cross-country com-
parisons, rather than investigating sub-national sectors of individual cases. This literature
focuses on the differences across countries in order to investigate which institutional ele-
ments have an impact on sub-national fiscal policy. Rodden (2002, 2006) uses a panel-data
set of forty-three OECD, developing, and developed countries over ten years (1986 to 1996).
A first set of results is based on ten-year average regressions, capturing long-run effects. He
finds that vertical fiscal imbalance (i.e. the share of grants and shared taxes in revenues)
is positively related to deficits. For a second set of results all countries are grouped in two
categories: countries with high and low borrowing autonomy. For the former he finds that
vertical fiscal imbalance is still a driving force of deficits, while there is no effect for the
latter. As already mentioned in the conclusion of that paper, more work should be done
to investigate the effects of tax autonomy, and in particular the changes over time and the
different degrees of borrowing autonomy. Plekhanov and Singh (2006) analyze with a panel
dataset over 1982-2000 which specific institutional design of borrowing constraints prevents
large sub-national deficits. Their classification of fiscal rules is based on dummies according
to the way the rules are imposed. This paper finds, while averaging over all years for each
country, that rules imposed by the center and cooperative agreements might reduce deficits
when the vertical imbalance is large.
These days, however, almost all European sub-national governments are constrained by
some restrictions, and the pure classification into categories as in Plekhanov and Singh
(2006) is not without ambiguity. Another probable shortcoming of the existing empirical
literature is that none of the papers provide a panel analysis which takes the changes over
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time into account. This is either because time invariant indicators are used, and hence
institutional changes are neglected, or between estimations were carried out. Furthermore,
fiscal rules differ over time and how stringent and transparent they are applied. In par-
ticular European countries introduced numerous rules for sub-national sectors over the last
two decades. Therefore, I use a continuous index, rather than a categorical approach, to
investigate whether the strictness of rules has an impact. Similar arguments apply to the
characterization of own-source revenues. The concept of vertical fiscal imbalance should
be carefully reconsidered, since it was not accounted for shared taxes. But shared taxes,
collected by the center and then redistributed to the lower level sectors, might not be any
different from grants in terms of incentives as tax rates cannot be decided at the sub-national
level. I rather focus on the development of own-source taxes, which takes into account the
distortionary nature of taxes, when central governments ask for adjustments by increasing
tax rates rather than providing additional funds through bail-outs or by increasing grants.
This is even more important since the underlying problem of soft budget constraints is a
dynamic one. Solving these issues is one of the main contributions of this paper. I esti-
mate panel models where I carefully construct the tax autonomy of sub-national sectors,
the different strength of borrowing restrictions in the form of fiscal rules, and explicitly take
into account the variation over time. This can be interpreted as comparing the outcome
for times before major reforms in rules and tax autonomy were implemented with the time
after implementation.
A further well known problem in the literature on fiscal rules is that their impact on deficits
does not necessarily have to be causal. Studies on the national level have highlighted the
lack of good quality instruments in order to address a problem of endogeneity. This explicit
sub-national context, however, allows finding variables that are correlated with the fiscal
rules index, but are orthogonal to the error term. I exploit the fact that fiscal rules are
in almost all cases imposed by a higher level of government. Earlier contributions have
shown that political economy variables are able to explain the stringency of fiscal rules
(see Debrun et al. (2008), for instance). However, on the national level these variables
might not be simultaneously uncorrelated with budgetary outcomes. Although this is true
on the national level, in the case of sub-national sectors the decision maker over rules
(the central government) and the decision maker over budgetary policy (the sub-national
entities) are unconnected. I will make use of the fact that the characteristics of central
governments, which impose rules on the sub-national one, are unlikely to be correlated with
their budgetary outcomes, but describe well the prevalence of rules. The attempt to solve
this endogeneity problem is another contribution of this paper compared to the existing
literature.
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4. Identification
The main objective of this paper is to analyze whether a measure of the budgetary position
can be explained by autonomy over taxation and fiscal rules, as tools which might restrict
governments from profligacy. I estimate a reduced form model of a fiscal reaction function
according to equation (1):
Di,t = γtaxi,t−1 + δrulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (1)
The dependent variable is a measure of the budget deficit Di,t at the sub-national level. The
impact of the tax-structure in terms of sub-national autonomy is captured by the parameter
γ. I estimate the reaction to a lagged variable of the share of taxes which are under discretion
of the respective government. I argue that using the one period lag is important since policy
makers will use their knowledge from the past to build their expectations about the future.
A high dependency on own-source taxes in the past indicates that it is likely that current
deficits must be paid back by own resources instead of expecting to receive transfers from
the central government. The parameter δ captures the impact of fiscal rules, as an explicit
way to restrict public finances. The data section spends special attention to the question
how the variables tax and rules are constructed. The impact of other explanatory control
variables is measured by the parameters in the vector β. µi and ηt are individual and time
fixed effects, respectively.
The inclusion of individual fixed effects is, besides capturing unobserved heterogeneity,
important to focus on the dynamic nature of the underlying problem. I aim at an estimate
of the impact of changes in the institutional framework on budgetary outcomes in the form
of annual deficits. Hence, the question is how rules and autonomy affect deficits in the short
run, and the inclusion of fixed effects captures all time invariant factors.
In addition, it is important to take the connection of the sub-national level to the higher
level of government into account. Basically, the mechanism to tie lower levels hands by
giving them autonomy might work pretty well in federations, where lower levels have a
substantial degree of freedom over their policies. On the contrary, in unitary countries the
sub-national level is more or less the extension of central governmental policies. When the
sub-national level is not much more than a branch of the central one, a credible commitment
of the center to a no-bailout strategy might be impossible in any case (even in line with a
positive impact of autonomy on deficits).
Di,t = γΦ′taxi,t−1 + δΦ′rulesi,t + βXi,t + µi + ηt + εi,t (2)
To capture these effects, I estimate models according to equation (2) and interact a set of
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dummies Φ with the main variables of interest.
Φ′ =
 Φ1
Φ2
 and = 1 if unitary country, 0 otherwise
= 1 if local or regional level in a federal country, else 0
These dummies classify the respective form of government, as given in table 1. Eventually
I end up with separate coefficients on tax autonomy and fiscal rules for federal and unitary
countries.
To address problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, I estimate cluster-robust
forms of the variance-covariance matrix. In some cases the small number of groups relative
to coefficients does not allow to cluster over countries. In that case I estimate the variance-
covariance matrix according to Newey and West (1987) with standard errors that are robust
to both, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC). As a robustness check, I also estimate
dynamic models with a lagged dependent variable. Unfortunately, this implies an additional
problem, since fixed effects estimates are likely to be biased as long as the time span is short
(Nickell, 1981). To control for the bias introduced by the lagged dependent variable together
with fixed effects, I use the bias-corrected version constructed by Bruno (2005) and bootstrap
the standard errors. Judson and Owen (1999) show that this is the appropriate choice for a
panel with my characteristics, i.e. when neither N nor T is large.
The possibility that fiscal rules are the result of, rather than the reason for fiscal perfor-
mance, requires a careful analysis of causality. I use an instrumental variable approach to
overcome this hurdle. Therefore, I estimate the factors determining the fiscal rules index. I
include political determinants of the level of government which introduces the rules, indica-
tors of the general fiscal stance of the respective country, as well as dummies for different
time periods (the time of the Stability and Growth Pact, for instance) and further controls
into the model. According to equation (3), I estimate a model for each value of the fiscal
rules index j across countries, using the average of covariates during the time when the rule
was applied:
rulesj = γpolj + δbudgetj + θtimej + βXj + εj (3)
Furthermore I estimate a fixed effects model to capture the variance in rules over time
according to the model in equation (4):
rulesi,t = γpoli,t + δbudgeti,t + θtimei,t + βXi,t + µi + εi,t (4)
Ideally, this step offers candidates for instruments. Finally, I re-estimate equation (1) and
use instruments for the fiscal rules index. I spend additional attention to the validity of
instruments in section 6.3.
This identification procedure corrects some drawbacks of former empirical approaches.
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First, the focus on the within variance with time-varying indicators allows identification of
the effects in the short run. Second, including the lagged value of tax autonomy creates a
better reflection that decision makers form their expectations by observed values from the
previous period. Finally, the proper choice of instruments can eliminate a potential source
of endogeneity.
5. Data
I use aggregated data for sub-national sectors to investigate the deficit bias which might
occur due to the relationships between different governmental layers in European countries.
All EU15 members are included over a period ranging from 1995 to 2008. I include regional
and local governments as separate observations in the four federal organized member states.
This provides 19 observations per year and 266 in total.
The dependent variable is a measure of the budgetary position in each year. While several
possible definitions are at hand, I chose to use annual deficits as a share of revenues. Other
possibilities included defining the dependent variable as the deficit per capita or as a share
of GDP. I took the decision in favor of my choice, since this measure incorporates differences
in capabilities to raise revenues, as the deficit is expressed as a share of the revenue capacity
in a given year.2
Two important indicators have to be computed in order to investigate the effects of fiscal
rules and tax autonomy. I construct both indicators as a time-varying index that captures
the development for each country over the entire time period.
First, an indicator of tax autonomy is needed to test whether the dependency on own tax
resources creates incentives not to balance the books. The smaller the share of revenues from
own-source taxation is, the higher the expectation over a bailout in times of fiscal stress.
I compute an indicator of the share of own-source tax revenues in total revenues on each
governmental level, respectively. The classification of own-source revenues is, unfortunately,
not straightforward. Other studies rely on the degree of vertical imbalance or the share
of taxes in total revenues, which can be misleading.3 It is important to distinguish real
own-source revenues from revenues which arise due to tax-sharing arrangements, i.e. taxes
collected by a higher level and automatically transferred to the lower one. The OECD
(1999) provides a classification of the taxing power of sub-national levels. Unfortunately,
their Fiscal Decentralization Database provides only information for two or at most three
years, 1995, 2002, and 2005. I use the Revenue Statistics of the OECD, the Taxes in Europe
2Taking deficits as a share of revenues or expenditures as the dependent variable follows the previous
studies in this literature. However, the correlation with other possible measures, as expressing deficits as a
share of GDP or in per capita terms, is high. See table 2 for details.
3A good example are German federal states. Their share of tax revenues on total revenues is substantial,
but almost all tax revenues are distributed to this level by transfers from the central or local level. The
share of real own-source taxes is close to zero.
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database of the European Commission, numerous national sources over changes in tax-
systems, and the information provided by Stegarescu (2005) to construct an indicator over
the entire 14 years of the sample.4 I treat all taxes over which either discretion on rates,
reliefs, or both are under the power of the sub-national entity as own-source tax revenues.
This measure does not overestimate the revenue autonomy in the presence of shared taxes.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of this indicator. The Nordic countries are
characterized by the largest share of autonomous revenues while German states, both Aus-
trian sectors, Ireland, and the Netherlands have on average very little discretion over their
revenues. Variation in the indicator is generated due to two different effects. On the one
hand, the tax-system can be changed, equipping lower level governments with a richer set of
instruments or more autonomy over existing taxes. Some governmental sectors, such as the
Spanish regions and the sub-national Italian sector have implemented considerable changes
within this period. On the other hand, the share of other revenues could also shift when
the center allocates resources to lower level tiers. Thus, an increasing value of this indica-
tor represents a higher responsibility at the sub-national level and might help to avoid soft
budget constraints.
I construct a second indicator to depict the strength of fiscal rules, i.e. how stringent
borrowing is regulated. Fiscal rules are nowadays a frequently used tool on the sub-national
level in European countries (European Commission, 2009, 2008, 2006; Sutherland et al.,
2005), with the attempt to mitigate a deficit bias and to harden the budget constraint by
imposing numerical targets on budgetary variables or limiting the access to credits. I use
the data provided by the European Commission (2009) to create an index that indicates
the strictness of these rules. All fiscal rules which may have an impact on the deficit are
included in the calculation of the index. These are balanced-budget-rules, debt breaks, and
other restrictions on borrowing.5 The original EU index is adjusted to the situation of sub-
national levels. In the non-federal countries, an average of the rules applying to different
levels, weighted by their share of expenditures in the total sub-national budget, is used.6
Figure 3 shows the development of this indicator.
[Figure 3 about here]
The restrictions are relatively stable over time in one group of countries (Belgium, Ger-
many, Denmark, France, and Finland) while another group (Austria, Spain, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Sweden) has increased the strictness of rules in recent years. Most of these
4The dataset and a comprehensive overview which taxes and changes in tax codes are taken into account
will be shortly available online.
5Expenditure ceilings are very rare at the sub-national level and, as in the original EU variable, excluded
for the main analysis of the impact of rules on deficits.
6The construction of this index is described in detail in Appendix D.
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countries introduced national stability pacts as an answer to the limitations arising from EU
rules. A third group (Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) goes
without strict rules. When these fiscal arrangements worked as an effective tool to dampen
a deficit bias, a negative coefficient is expected.
The other controls are summarized in table 3. The fiscal position of the central government
def cg rev is included to capture a copycat effect. Sub-national governments that observe
a loose fiscal policy at the national level can just follow the example given by the central
government, expecting that they are not sanctioned if the higher level is profligate as well.
[Table 3 about here]
The degree of decentralization is taken into account by the share of sub-national expendi-
tures in general government expenditures edec. Unfortunately, this indicator is not able to
distinguish between expenditures that could be categorized as compulsory or those that are
optional. Nevertheless, the share of expenditures captures the weight of the sub-national
sector in the general budget and how spending proportions are shared between the govern-
mental levels. These shares differ across European countries, with varying responsibilities
and discretion over their exercises.
[Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4 shows the country means over my period of study. The Nordic countries, for in-
stance, are characterized by a high level of services and responsibilities on the local level.
Danish sub-national governments spend on average more than every second Danske kroner,
followed by their Swedish and Finnish neighbors. The regional levels of Belgium, Spain,
and Germany are responsible for approximately one quarter of total expenditures, accom-
panied by their local governments with additional, but lower expenditure shares. The less
decentralized countries are France, Portugal, Luxembourg, and Greece. The plot against
the average of own-source tax revenues indicates that in many cases higher expenditure de-
centralization is accompanied by a higher degree of autonomy over tax revenues. As noted
before, this is not the case for some countries, in particular for the German federal states,
but also not for Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands.
Additional covariates are included to capture cyclical and institutional effects and to
consider the spending needs of lower-level governments. I include the output gap outgap,
the unemployment rate unempl, the ratio of the working age to total population depratio,
the log of total population ln totpop, and interest expenses intexp rev. All fiscal variables
are computed as share of revenues.
Table 4 summarizes the additional political variables, which I take into account for the
estimation of fiscal rules themselves. The motivation for the central government to impose
restrictions on lower level governments could be determined by the perception that a soft
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budget problem is at hand. Thus, the federal structure itself plays a role and several de-
terminants of the deficit might also be crucial for the strictness of rules. These issues are
taken into account by using some of the variables already discussed. However, the center
must also believe that fiscal rules are a mean to cure the problem and must be able to im-
plement the rules through the legislature. Hence, political variables which characterize the
central government and its preferences are related to fiscal rules, since they describe general
preferences for a rules based framework. Most of the data is obtained from the World Bank
Database of Political Institutions 2009 (Beck et al., 2001).
[Table 4 about here]
To control for whether the ideological orientation of the government plays a role, an index
over the two main government parties, reaching from zero (left-wing, single party govern-
ment) to one (right-wing, single party government), is calculated. A general perception is
that conservative governments show a tendency towards lower deficits, and might impose
stricter rules, but cross-country evidence on that is rather mixed. Nevertheless, the parti-
san relation could represent preferences for fiscal stability, with the result that right-wing
governments might opt for more stringent rules to restrain the sub-national level.
The Herfindahl index measures the fractionalization of the ruling coalition. A single
party government yields a value of one, while values close to zero indicate a more dispersed
government. This index can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly picked
members of the ruling coalition belong to the same party. The expected sign of this variable
is not clear. On the one hand, a more fragmented government could be willing to restrict
lower levels, because they are able to blame other coalition members when local or regional
politicians complain about new rules. On the other hand, a less fragmented government
might find it easier to pass new rules through the legislature.
The district magnitude measures the average number of seats in the parliament per elec-
toral district. Beside the impact on the effective number of parties,7 the district magnitude
might have an additional impact in the sub-national context. A higher value indicates that
more seats are allocated within one electoral district. Hence, the connection between lo-
cal politics and the politicians elected into the central parliament might be loose. On the
contrary, a small district magnitude means that the representative in the central legislature
could be seen as directly responsible for the respective district. A strong connection to
the sub-national level might cause representatives to be cautious with imposing strict rules,
because they do not want to cross with local politicians, and neither voters.
Finally, I include the predicted form of fiscal governance, according to von Hagen and
Harden (1995), Hallerberg et al. (2007), and Hallerberg et al. (2009). This literature char-
acterizes whether a delegation or contract approach of fiscal governance is appropriate in
7The idea was developed by Duverger (1954), tested empirically by Taagepera and Shugart (1993) and
put in the context of budgetary politics by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).
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different countries. Centralizing the budget process could be done by the former approach
under which governments give authority to one special member that is vested with special
strategic power. On the national level the finance minister is typically in charge of this
special function. The latter approach instead relies on contracts between all members of
the cabinet with spending rights. I include the indicator developed in this literature to
investigate whether central governments that are assumed to be contract countries follow
this approach when designing rules for sub-national levels.
6. Results
This section presents the results of my estimations. After estimating the baseline model
in the first subsection, I investigate the factors which determine the strictness of fiscal
frameworks in the second subsection. The goal is to identify the driving forces behind fiscal
rules in order to use them as instruments for the estimations, when fiscal rules are treated as
endogenous. The results from these estimations are presented in the last subsection, where
I also discuss my findings in more detail.
6.1. The impact of sub-national fiscal rules on budgetary
outcomes
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions on budgetary outcomes. The dependent
variable in any model is the share of the annual deficit in revenues at the respective sub-
national sector. Positive values arise if expenditures exceed revenues and all coefficients
with a negative sign improve the budgetary position by reducing deficits.
[Table 5 about here]
The first two columns show results from regressions according to equation (1), while the first
column (a) does not include neither individual nor time fixed effects, but panel-corrected
standard errors (PCSE). I find neither significant effects of the lagged tax autonomy nor
the strength of fiscal rules when I pool all observations and include a dummy variable for
federal countries. As mentioned earlier, including fixed effects is superior to cross section
models since the variation within groups over time is important. In addition, an F-test
(F(18,216)=6.21, p-value 0.00) indicates that significant individual effects are at present, thus
simple cross section estimations are not sufficient. Therefore, I turn to fixed effect models
in columns (b) to (e), since a Hausman test rejects the appropriateness of random effects
(χ2(12)=42.49, p-value=0.00).
Results of model (b) are similar to those from the cross section without any significant
effect of tax autonomy or fiscal rules on deficits. However, the means to cure the deficit bias
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might be different depending whether the respective country is a unitary one or a federation.
To control for the likely different effects I turn to the estimation of specification (2) from
column (c) onwards.
These estimations show encouraging results. The lagged tax autonomy is significant for
any type of government. Interestingly, coefficients are different across the groups. According
to the hypothesis of soft budget constraints, sub-national governments in federations run
lower deficits when their share of own-source tax revenues in the previous year has been a
relatively large share in total revenues. Hence, given an increase in the share of revenues
directly at their hands, it might be perceived that these own generated revenues also have
to be used for potential future liabilities, causing lower present deficits. Sub-national sectors
in unitary countries instead show up with an opposing behavior. These governments might
anticipate that they are more or less the extension of the central government and giving them
more autonomy does not constrain them sufficiently from profligate spending. Nevertheless,
when I estimate the model with cluster robust standard errors in column (d), or a dynamic
specification in column (e), tax autonomy in unitary countries is not significant anymore.
These findings are in line with those of Rodden (2002): more autonomy over revenues
generated by own-source taxation is an implicit tool to constraint sub-national governments
in federal organized countries. Although effective in federations, this does not seem to work
for unitary countries.
Fortunately, fiscal rules do, but only for the group of unitary countries. Sub-national
governments in non-federal states overspend less when fiscal rules are stricter and hence the
access to borrowing is limited. In this case, fiscal rules are an effective tool to mitigate a
deficit bias, although tax autonomy is not. However, this does not hold true for entities
in federal organized states, where in no specification a significant impact is detected. The
result of the dynamic model in column (e) corroborates this result. Fiscal rules prevent
only sub-national sectors in non-federal countries from running deficits. For the rest of the
paper, I take model (d) as the prefered benchmark estimation.
After all, there seems to be a way to control sub-national public finances for each type of
country and a careful consideration of the intergovernmental relations is required when such
rules should be implemented. Given the overall autonomy, which is characteristically for
federal countries, higher autonomy over taxes yields on average lower deficits. Not being shy
with autonomy is the way to go in this case. On the other hand, a framework based on fiscal
rules works well in unitary organized countries. This is likely to be the case because these
governments have no instruments or enough legal autonomy to circumvent the limitations.
The other covariates are in line with expectations. Lower level governments follow the
example of the center, since larger deficits on that level are positively correlated with those on
the sub-national level. Countries that are more decentralized in terms of expenditure shares
also run on average higher deficits. Demographic changes reveal two interesting insights.
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First, when the total population grows, so do deficits. Local services are often connected to
the number of people that call for them; hence more people represent larger spending needs.
Second, when the share of the working population grows, budgetary positions improve. All
other variables do not have an impact on deficits which is significantly different from zero
in either model.8
However, here the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules is still unsolved. I will spend more
attention on the interpretation of results once this problem is solved after the following
sub-section.
6.2. The determinants of sub-national fiscal rules
Whereas national fiscal rules are often self imposed, sub-national rules are not. They are
almost always imposed by the central level, and institutional and political variables of that
level might have an impact on the strictness of the rules themselves. Even though one can
argue that in federal countries the regional level could impose rules on the local one, this
is not observed over the last decades. The new fiscal frameworks in Spain and Austria
for instance, were both imposed on sub-national levels by the central government. Also the
municipal codes of German local governments show little variation across federal states with
respect to fiscal rules.9 This section explores which factors induce a higher reliance on rules,
and what circumstances might trigger the adoption of rules.
[Table 6 about here]
The first column of table 6 presents the results from an OLS regression according to equation
(3) of each single outcome of the fiscal rules index on the average values over the period
where one set of rules was in force in a given country.10 In other words, each value of
the fiscal rules index appearing in a country is regressed on the average values of all other
covariates during that time. This simple approach reveals interesting insights, at which
I look with more sophisticated methods according to equation (4) in columns (b) to (e),
while the first two remaining models provide cross-sectional evidence, and the last two show
results from fixed effect estimations. Models (c) and (e) include also the lagged value of the
rules index in order to account for the persistency of this variable.
8The dynamic model shows only a significant effect of total population, while for all other variables
estimates are not significantly different from zero.
9Self imposed rules of particular regional governments and their local counterparts are a somewhat new
phenomenon. My sample covers data up to 2008, and none of the rules was self imposed by a regional
level or imposed by that level on the local government sector. Recently, a referendum in one federal state
in Germany (Hesse) has voted for the first regional rule which is not common to all states. I am looking
forward to investigate the effectiveness of these new fiscal arrangements once enough data is available.
10The interpretation of dummies that vary over time such as elections or the stability and growth pact are
in this estimation an indicator over the relative number of events in the respective time span. For example,
sgp takes the value 0.6 if the rules was valid during 6 years of the Stability and Growth Pact.
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The top panel of the tables shows the impact of political variables on the rules index.
The first variable herfgov is significant and negative in almost all specifications, except
the dynamic specifications in models (c) and (e). According to that, a government which
consists of a single party or of one big and one small coalition member, represented by a
higher value of the Herfindahl fractionalization index (i.e. a less fractionalized one), tends
to impose less strict rules. One-party governments might receive more leeway from their
sub-national counterparts and might try to avoid this conflict. Countries that are supposed
to follow a contract approach of fiscal governance on the central level (Hallerberg et al.,
2009) impose less strict rules on their sub-national governments. The district magnitude
also becomes significant and positive in the panel specifications.11 This supports the view
that rather loose connections to lower level politics increase the use of fiscal rules at the
sub-national level.
The other political variables, and neither budgetary ones, do not have an impact on the
rules themselves. It is important to note that this implies that sub-national deficits do not
have a feedback effect on rules. The only budgetary variable which is significant in at least
one specification is the lagged debt level of the general government in the panel specification
(d). Thus, central governments impose restrictions when general fiscal stress is at hand, but
do not react to deficits at the sub-national level.
In terms of timing, the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact has (from 1999
onwards) increased the strength of rules. This effect is not surprising since most national
stability pacts were introduced as an answer to the EU fiscal framework in order to force the
lower level governments not to counteract central level fiscal policies. Also not surprising is
that rules increase over time, as indicated by the included linear trend. Out of the other
control variables only the demographic structure, the population size, the sub-national tax
autonomy, and unemployment have an increasing impact on the implementation of fiscal
rules.
To sum up, the fractionalization of the government in power, the district magnitude, and
the predicted form of fiscal governance determine the strictness of sub-national fiscal rules.
Ideology of the central government and national elections instead do not. Neither do the
budgetary variables, beside the lagged overall level of debt, as long as a static model is
estimated. However, constituencies in federal countries, as indicated by the two dummies
against the base group of unitary countries, rely more on rules than their non federal coun-
terparts. Given the results over the effectiveness of fiscal rules from the previous section,
those countries seem to back the wrong horse. This also could indicate that the political
actions of the center to implement rules in unitary and federal countries might be different.
In particular, the timing when the center implements rules, and thus whether the present
11Due to the little within variance, I check whether this result is robust when I include time dummies.
The parameter is still significant at the same level.
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or lagged political variables matter, may differ as the ultimate results have suggested.
[Table 7 about here]
The estimations presented in table 7 show that this is indeed the case. Model (a) to (e)
include separate coefficients for federations and unitary states as well as their one period lag
for one of the political variables per estimated equation, respectively. For example, column
(a) shows a regression with four different coefficients for the impact of the Herfindahl index
on rules: the current value of federal countries, the lagged value of federal countries, the
current value of unitary countries, and finally the lagged value for this group. Models (b) to
(e) continue with this procedure for the other covariates. Column (f) shows the estimates
of the full model, including lagged and current values of all variables simultaneously.
Model (a) shows that it is rather the one period lag than the current value of the Herfind-
ahl index which matters. Furthermore, it can be seen that federal countries do not follow
the direction described above. In this case there is a positive relationship, indicating that
less fractionalization is associated with stricter rules. In federal countries the central govern-
ment might impose those stricter rules in order to tie the hands of sub-national politicians,
which might belong to a different party. A ideological position of central govenments which
is contrary to the majority of sub-national ones is a frequently observed feature in federal
countries. Surprisingly ideology is now marginal significant at the 90% level for unitary
countries when the lags of all variables are included in the model as shown in (f). Election
year effects (b) instead are still not observable. As for fragmentation, also the district mag-
nitude seems to be more important one period lagged for unitary countries, but according
to estimation (d) and (f) signs do not change. A higher value of this variable is still increas-
ing the rules index. The contract approach in central governments’ fiscal policy instead is
different for both types of countries with respect to the timing. For the federal ones the
actual one is significant and negative, while for the unitary states the one period lagged
value matters.
These results, while interesting on its own, are important to answer a last open ques-
tion, namely the causality between rules and fiscal outcomes. My instrumental variable
approach, presented in the next sub-section, builds heavily of the results derived above.
Most importantly, the proper choice of instruments can be different for the two distinct
types of countries.
6.3. Endogeneity, IV results, and discussion
The relationship between budgetary outcomes and fiscal rules might be confounded by po-
tential endogeneity of the latter. The enacted fiscal policy could be the cause for, rather
than the result of, the adoption of fiscal rules. In this case countries with fiscal difficulties
at the sub-national level might impose stricter rules. The different stringency of fiscal rules
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across countries could be also driven by an omitted variable, in particular preferences for fis-
cal discipline, as noted by Poterba (1996). If balanced budgets attain an outstanding status
in some states, those countries might impose stricter rules according to their preferences.
At the same time, according to their preferences, deficits might be lower per se. Hence, it
has to be secured that the impact of rules on deficits, as estimated in section 6.1, is indeed
going from tighter rules to better budgetary positions (at least in unitary states) and not
that countries with a preference for lower deficits just impose stricter rules. However, the
direction of the bias is not clear at this stage, since the two possible explanations given
above would either bias the impact of rules towards or away from zero.
I use an instrumental variables approach to solve this question. Variables that satisfy
the two properties of valid instruments, namely being uncorrelated with the error of the re-
gression of equation (2), but highly correlated with the rules index, must be found. This is
usually regarded as a complicated task: explanations for the prevalence of fiscal institutions,
for instance political variables which reflect preferences, might be simultaneously connected
to the result of fiscal policy. This would imply that they are correlated with the variable that
captures fiscal rules, but also with the error term. The context of sub-national budgetary
outcomes instead offers a convenient feature to tackle this hurdle. Rules and institutions for
lower level governments are introduced by a higher level of government. Thus, the charac-
teristics that drive the introduction of the rules, as worked out in section 6.2, are correlated
with the rules itself (and might be correlated with the budgetary outcomes of that higher
governmental level), but not with the budgetary position of the governments where the rules
are imposed on. Fortunately, the previous section has shown that political characteristics
of the central government are indeed related to the strictness of rules. In addition, there
was no feedback effect of deficits, what excludes that central governments introduce rules
when sub-national deficits are regarded as unsustainable. Hence, there are possible candi-
dates for a set of excluded instruments which are correlated with the endogenous fiscal rules
variables, but are not correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation. In other
words, those variables are likely to be in line with the exclusion restriction in instrumental
variable regressions.
[Table 8 about here]
I use the variables which are, according to the previous section, found to be correlated
with the fiscal rules index as instruments for the interacted fiscal rules index. These are
the interacted district magnitude, the form of fiscal governance, and the Herfindahl index
of government fractionalization. The results of these regressions are shown in table 8.12
Column (a) repeats the estimation without instruments for comparison. Models (b) and (c)
differ only in the way how standard errors are computed. The set of instruments for these
12I report the first stage estimations for all regressions using instruments in Appendix A.
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two estimations contains the actual political variables for federations, but the one-period lag
for unitary countries. The absolute value of the coefficient on fiscal rules in unitary countries
is now more or less twice as large as before. This indicates that the earlier estimate was
biased towards zero. In terms of significance both models make the same predictions, and
surprisingly also tax autonomy in unitary countries is gaining significance. The positive
coefficients, however, indicates that higher autonomy in this group of countries does not
work as a limitation but rather as an augmentation for deficits. This opposing effect is
in line with expectations: in contrast to federations, sub-national governments in unitary
countries are more or less a branch of the center, and hence they assume the center to take
over liabilities anyway.
The model in column (d) uses the full set of instruments (i.e. lagged and current values)
for both, the federal and unitary fiscal rules index. Results are pretty similar to the previous
ones, but the validity of instruments changes slightly. While neither of the models seems to
be affected by overidentification (note that the Hansen J-test does always accept the null of
joint validity13), the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic for weak identification in models (b) and
(c) is superior to (d). Since the models with different instruments for the unitary and federal
index works better, all instruments might not be suited equally well for the two groups.
[Table 9 about here]
To shows this in detail, I present separate regressions for each type of country in table
9. Therefore the estimations labeled ’I’ include only the unitary countries, while those
labeled ’II’ include local and regional sectors of federations. Models (a) use the full set of
instruments, while (b) involves only current values and (c) only lagged values, respectively.
Signs and significance of the two main variables of interest do not change compared to the
estimations before. A higher degree of tax autonomy is still mitigating the deficit bias in
federations and exaggerating deficits in unitary countries. Rules continue to prevent deficits
in unitary countries in all specifications, but with the additional insight that the proper
choice of instruments depends the type of country. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic reveals
that actual values are better suited as instruments for federal organized countries, while this
is true for the one period lags for estimating the effect in unitary countries. Also control
variables behave differently, and federal countries respond stronger to cyclical elements such
as the output gap, unemployment, and deficits at the central level. At the end of the day
these regressions confirm and robustify the earlier conclusions, while indicating that the
timing of instruments is important in this context.
[Figures 5 and 6 about here]
13The joint null is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. both requirements are fulfilled: they
are uncorrelated with the error term, and the excluded instruments do not have to be included into the
estimated equation.
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These results are encouraging for policy makers. Figure 5 depicts the marginal effect of
stricter rules in unitary countries and figure 6 the effect of tax autonomy in federations.
The bars on the left show the actual value of the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy in the
year 2008. Significant improvements of budgetary positions are potentially feasible through
reforms of rule frameworks and the structure of tax systems. This is particularly true for
countries which currently make little use of those mechanisms. A one standard deviation in
unitary countries (0.303, cf. table 3) increase in the rules index decreases the annual share
of deficits in revenues on average by 2.7 per cent. A one standard deviation increase in the
tax autonomy of federations (0.122, cf. table 3) causes a reduction of deficits of about 3.5
per cent, ceteris paribus. Hence changes in the institutional framework, in particular the
adoption of another set of fiscal rules or changing autonomy over taxes, can help to reduce
deficits in the short run and debts in the long run.
A last issue is whether these two instruments work in isolation or whether there is an
interplay between the two. To check for this, I re-estimate the model and allow for interaction
between the fiscal rules index and tax autonomy.14
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
Figure 7 shows a plot of the marginal effect of fiscal rules in unitary countries. The inter-
action term is not significant in this case (p-value=0.6, cf. table 13 in the appendix). The
negative impact on deficits remains more or less the same in terms of magnitude when tax
autonomy varies. Tax autonomy itself was instead identified as the proper tool for federal
countries. The marginal effect in this case is depicted in figure 7. Here the interaction
term is significant (p-value=0.03, cf. table 13 in the appendix) and the figure shows that
this tool becomes more effective when fiscal rules are tighter. That is, even though rules
themselves do not help, an increase in tax autonomy should be considered together with
the rules framework. In the policy arena, these results and in particular the fact that the
effectiveness of tools to restrict deficits depends on the countries’ type should be carefully
taken into consideration.
7. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to explore which institutional arrangements help to keep the
books of sub-national governments in balance. I focused on two different mechanisms which
are potentially able to constrain the sub-national sector from fiscal profligacy. On the one
hand I investigated the role of own tax resources, since less autonomy creates incentives to
run deficits because of bail-out expectations. On the other hand, I studied the impact of
fiscal rules, which a central government might impose to restrict the sub-national sector.
14Estimates are shown in table 13 of appendix C.
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My main findings are that a well designed framework of fiscal rules works in unitary
countries, but not per se in federations. Because of the higher autonomy which local and
regional governments in federal countries enjoy, a rules based framework does not help in
this case. Here, it is rather higher autonomy over tax instruments that might prevent large
deficits at the sub-national sector. These findings suggest that the choice of tools depends
critically on the type of government and the federal background. This complements the
literature of fiscal rules on the general government level, where the political environment
and the electoral system, for instance, are important determinants for the effectiveness of
fiscal rules (Hallerberg et al., 2007). As a result, a suitable framework needs to be tailored
to the characteristics of a specific country. More stringent rules might not always result in
more desirable outcomes and neither does a restriction of tax autonomy. Both instruments
need to be considered together with the other institutional arrangements of the respective
country.
This article is a further step in sub-national public finance in order to explore how deficits
could be avoided and large debts prevented. My findings suggest several issues for future
research. The next step should be to make use of decentralized data for several European
countries, rather than the aggregated sub-national sector. This allows investigating addi-
tional effects which occur horizontally within the sub-national governments in combination
with the vertical dimension between governmental levels, as explored in this paper. An-
other interesting point is the recent introduction of self-imposed fiscal rules in some regions
of federal countries. Federations often grant autonomy to sub-national governments which
allows them to adopt rules by themselves. The German state of Hesse for example, has held
a referendum and 70% of voters opted for the introduction of a fiscal rule into the regional
constitution. Since self-imposed rules might be an important signal to the markets, and also
do reflect the preferences of voters, effects might differ from those of centrally imposed rules
in federations. The evaluation of the effectiveness might be an interesting task for future
research, once enough data is available.
By all means, the recent development in European public finances has shown that the
debate over public deficits and debts, in particular in the context of multi-tier governments,
will remain on the schedule for the upcoming years. The results of this work might be of
particular interest when it comes to the design of fiscal relationships between the supra-
national and national level. The expierence from one step below as in this paper can help
to propose ideas how such a system can work properly.
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Figure 1: Sub-national outstanding debt
federal countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain
(local and regional levels included seperately)
unitary countries Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands,Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom
(consoldidated sub-national values included)
Table 1: Unitary and federal classification
27
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
1995 2000 2005 2010
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Austria (local level) Belgium (local level) Denmark Finland France
Germany (local level) Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg
The Netherlands Portugal Spain (local level) Sweden United Kingdom
Austria (regional level) Belgium (regional level) Germany (regional level) Spain (regional level)
o
w
n
-
s o
u
r c
e  
t a
x a
t i o
n
time
 
Notes: Share of tax revenues under discretion of the respective governmental level. Classification of auton-
omy according to the OECD fiscal decentralization database and national tax legislation.
Figure 2: Revenues from own-source taxation
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Figure 3: Fiscal rules index
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Figure 4: Decentralization over 1995-2008
Deficit (1) (2) (3)
as share of revenues (1) 1.000
in Euro per capita (2) 0.887 1.000
as share of GDP (3) 0.900 0.955 1.000
Table 2: Correlation of deficit measures
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
deficit/revenues Eurostat overall 0.006 0.034 -0.100 0.112
between 0.022 -0.042 0.062
within 0.026 -0.087 0.101
Tax autonomy
tax1 OECD, overall 0.227 0.172 0.000 0.646
own calculations between 0.173 0.003 0.625
within 0.037 0.061 0.370
tax ∗ federal overall 0.152 0.122 0.000 0.343
tax ∗ unitary overall 0.281 0.184 0.041 0.646
Fiscal rules
rules2 EC, overall 0.459 0.357 0.000 1.284
own calculations between 0.311 0.000 1.100
within 0.188 -0.014 1.061
rules ∗ federal overall 0.699 0.277 0.000 1.284
rules ∗ unitary overall 0.284 0.303 0.000 1.008
Controls
def cg rev3 Eurostat overall 0.081 0.113 -0.189 0.621
between 0.074 -0.031 0.276
within 0.087 -0.169 0.556
edec4 Eurostat overall 0.254 0.131 0.043 0.659
between 0.131 0.054 0.598
within 0.029 0.116 0.360
intexp rev5 Eurostat overall 0.942 1.307 0.004 5.875
between 1.303 0.007 5.382
within 0.306 0.042 2.256
outgap Eurostat overall 0.374 1.648 -4.707 5.209
between 0.372 -0.111 1.429
within 1.608 -4.540 5.376
ln totpop Eurostat overall 16.496 1.290 12.913 18.229
between 1.323 12.999 18.225
within 0.028 16.410 16.614
depratio6 Eurostat overall 0.670 0.012 0.636 0.690
between 0.011 0.646 0.685
within 0.006 0.640 0.687
unempl7 Eurostat overall 0.075 0.031 0.019 0.184
between 0.027 0.034 0.123
within 0.017 0.036 0.137
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1revenues from own-source taxes as share of total revenues; 2fiscal rules index; 3central govern-
ment deficit as share of revenues; 4 share of sub-national expenditures in general government expenditures; 5
interest expenditures as share of revenues; 6 share of working population in total population; 7unemployment
rate
Table 3: Summary statistics: Deficit estimation
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Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ideology1 World Bank, overall 0.376 0.327 0.000 1.000
own calculations between 0.131 0.089 0.589
Beck et al. (2001) within 0.301 -0.213 1.171
herfgov2 World Bank overall 0.666 0.270 0.181 1.000
Beck et al. (2001) between 0.257 0.221 1.000
within 0.101 0.350 1.004
disctrict3 World Bank overall 9.402 6.050 1.000 22.500
Beck et al. (2001) between 5.712 1.000 20.300
within 2.364 5.052 25.352
contract4 Hallerberg et al. (2009) overall 0.425 0.495 0.000 1.000
between 0.465 0.000 1.000
within 0.199 0.068 1.282
debt gg gdp5 Eurostat overall 0.634 0.265 0.061 1.304
between 0.255 0.071 1.102
within 0.091 0.406 1.019
N=19, T=14 (1995-2008), n=266
Definitions: 1index from zero (single party left-wing) to one (single party right-wing); 2Herfindahl measure
of fractionalization (probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to different political groups);
3district magnitude; 4 form of fiscal governance; 5debt at the general government level as share of gdp
Table 4: Summary statistics: Central government characteristics
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Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.006 -0.101
(0.023) (0.061)
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.195 0.153
(0.098) (0.120) (0.096)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.159*
(0.069) (0.056) (0.087)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.010)
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Controls
def cg rev 0.066** 0.087** 0.076** 0.076* 0.060*
(0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035)
edec 0.100*** 0.147* 0.214** 0.214*** 0.127
(0.026) (0.088) (0.087) (0.074) (0.078)
intexp rev 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
outgap -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl 0.173 -0.036 -0.047 -0.047 0.001
(0.123) (0.216) (0.209) (0.187) (0.193)
ln totpop 0.007* 0.365** 0.520*** 0.520*** 0.324**
(0.004) (0.180) (0.167) (0.136) (0.133)
depratio 0.326 -0.565* -0.603* -0.603* -0.356
(0.258) (0.322) (0.331) (0.356) (0.396)
trend 0.002*** 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.001)
federal 0.005
(0.009)
constant -0.391**
(0.187)
LDV 0.368***
(0.069)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.181 0.223 0.270 0.270
Standard errors in parentheses, see notes for details
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): pooled regression with panel corrected standard errors; Model (b) and (c):
fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey-West); Model (d): clustered standard errors at the individual level; Model (e) dynamic
panel data estimation, bias correction initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator, bootstrapped
standard errors with 1000 repetitions, LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
Table 5: Regressions of deficits
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Dependent Variable Cross Section Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Political variables
herfgov -0.641** -0.226** -0.066 -0.394*** -0.138
(0.231) (0.091) (0.074) (0.131) (0.087)
election -0.139 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.015
(0.233) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
ideology -0.112 -0.014 -0.014 0.036 0.011
(0.103) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
district 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.018*** 0.007*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
contract -0.501** -0.150** -0.064 -0.281*** -0.006
(0.182) (0.070) (0.057) (0.069) (0.051)
Budgetary variables
def rev -0.710 -0.160 -0.156 -0.119 -0.094
(1.754) (0.256) (0.244) (0.269) (0.320)
def rev(t−1) -0.195 -0.111 -0.356 -0.045
(0.262) (0.247) (0.313) (0.291)
debt gg gdp(t−1) -0.036 -0.004 -0.011 0.384** 0.083
(0.169) (0.094) (0.048) (0.153) (0.132)
Timing
sgp 0.374** 0.050* 0.061** 0.063* 0.072**
(0.156) (0.028) (0.025) (0.038) (0.028)
trend 0.018*** 0.002 0.020*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls
depratio 2.210 3.487* 0.565 7.055** 0.805
(3.315) (2.077) (1.164) (2.816) (1.978)
outgap 0.050 -0.005 0.001 -0.012 -0.005
(0.036) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
unempl 3.337* 0.490 0.242 0.848 -0.597
(1.833) (1.155) (1.120) (1.757) (1.412)
unempl(t−1) 0.688 0.301 -1.464 0.520
(1.080) (0.993) (1.528) (1.300)
tax 0.879** 0.538* 0.422 0.717* 0.717*
(0.363) (0.318) (0.339) (0.398) (0.390)
tax(t−1) 0.561* -0.135 1.350*** -0.097
(0.313) (0.339) (0.407) (0.383)
ln totpop 0.066 0.083*** 0.030* -0.022 0.580
(0.051) (0.029) (0.016) (0.821) (0.681)
edec 0.597 0.200 0.147 -0.594 -0.070
(0.359) (0.197) (0.109) (0.362) (0.324)
local dummy 0.203* 0.353*** 0.101**
(0.100) (0.068) (0.040)
regional dummy 0.291*** 0.436*** 0.117***
(0.102) (0.067) (0.043)
LDV 0.698*** 0.803***
(0.067) (0.065)
Constant -2.484 -3.780** -0.920
(2.350) (1.591) (0.874)
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.888 0.501 0.853 0.637
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) n=41, (2)-(5) n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Model (a): aggregated estimation according to equation 3; Models (b) and (c): pooled
regression with panel corrected standard errors; Model (d): fixed effect estimation with standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West); Model (e): bias correction
initialized by Arellano and Bond estimator, bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 repetitions,
LDV is the lagged dependent variable.
Table 6: Determinants of fiscal rules
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Dependent Variable Fixed Effect Panel Model
Rules Index (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Herfindahl index (fractionalization)
herfgov -0.381*** -0.387*** -0.443*** -0.358***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.132) (0.132)
herfgov ∗ federal -0.006 -0.078
(0.114) (0.116)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal 0.313*** 0.359***
(0.106) (0.102)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.335 -0.233
(0.229) (0.189)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.482* -0.641***
(0.274) (0.244)
Election year
election 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.014
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
election ∗ federal 0.038 0.038
(0.028) (0.025)
election(t−1) ∗ federal 0.011 -0.008
(0.021) (0.016)
election ∗ unitary 0.003 -0.004
(0.024) (0.021)
election(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.010 -0.012
(0.027) (0.023)
Ideology (1=right-wing single party)
ideology 0.056** 0.041 0.082*** 0.029
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
ideology ∗ federal -0.063 0.027
(0.040) (0.030)
ideology(t−1) ∗ federal 0.021 -0.011
(0.032) (0.030)
ideology ∗ unitary 0.055 0.075*
(0.052) (0.041)
ideology(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.069 0.057
(0.048) (0.042)
District magnitude
district 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
district ∗ federal -0.005 0.009
(0.007) (0.007)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.006 0.009**
(0.005) (0.005)
district ∗ unitary 0.011* 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.019*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003)
table continues on next page
35
cont’d (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Contract
contract -0.290*** -0.281*** -0.302*** -0.282***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068)
contract ∗ federal -0.346*** -0.351***
(0.089) (0.080)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal -0.003 0.057
(0.033) (0.037)
contract ∗ unitary -0.090 -0.095
(0.056) (0.070)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.073 -0.233**
(0.086) (0.098)
Controls
def rev -0.217 -0.153 -0.283 0.054 -0.170 -0.121
(0.241) (0.278) (0.264) (0.252) (0.273) (0.223)
def rev(t−1) -0.293 -0.352 -0.321 -0.264 -0.254 -0.340
(0.275) (0.318) (0.320) (0.307) (0.313) (0.275)
unempl -1.005 0.561 1.345 0.542 0.459 -1.387
(1.466) (1.782) (1.803) (1.828) (1.770) (1.441)
unempl(t−1) -0.291 -1.205 -1.895 -0.856 -1.134 -0.168
(1.256) (1.541) (1.603) (1.530) (1.526) (1.268)
tax 0.613* 0.779* 0.877** 0.875** 0.794* 0.642*
(0.329) (0.403) (0.389) (0.386) (0.412) (0.363)
tax(t−1) 1.190*** 1.336*** 1.351*** 1.309*** 1.322*** 1.139***
(0.371) (0.407) (0.389) (0.392) (0.409) (0.383)
depratio 5.510** 6.750** 8.374*** 8.798*** 6.536** 7.166***
(2.422) (2.795) (2.837) (2.913) (2.862) (2.476)
outgap -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
debt gg gdp 0.428*** 0.354** 0.410*** 0.300** 0.299* 0.482***
(0.128) (0.153) (0.148) (0.152) (0.155) (0.141)
ln pop tot 0.273 -0.134 -0.706 0.067 -0.034 -0.055
(0.658) (0.800) (0.850) (0.784) (0.809) (0.702)
edec -0.630* -0.552 -0.678* -0.423 -0.544 -0.642*
(0.360) (0.363) (0.384) (0.386) (0.375) (0.372)
sgp 0.054 0.061* 0.081** 0.053 0.057 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
trend 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R-squared 0.702 0.636 0.647 0.654 0.642 0.735
Number of Observations 247 247 247 247 247 247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Specification according to model (d) in table 6. Fixed effect estimation with standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 7: Determinants of fiscal rules II
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Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a) (b) (c) (d)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195 0.365* 0.365** 0.334**
(0.120) (0.190) (0.148) (0.141)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.289***
(0.056) (0.073) (0.075) (0.075)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.088** -0.088*** -0.079***
(0.014) (0.041) (0.026) (0.024)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001
(0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076* 0.076* 0.076** 0.077**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)
edec 0.214*** 0.197** 0.197** 0.201**
(0.074) (0.085) (0.088) (0.088)
intexp rev -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.097 -0.097 -0.092
(0.187) (0.215) (0.215) (0.214)
trend 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.544*** 0.544*** 0.542***
(0.136) (0.160) (0.168) (0.167)
depratio -0.603* -0.429 -0.429 -0.481
(0.356) (0.404) (0.377) (0.359)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluded Instruments none herfgovt ∗ federal herfgovt
districtt ∗ federal districtt
contractt ∗ federal contractt
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary herfgov(t−1)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary district(t−1)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary contract(t−1)
R-squared 0.173 0.134 0.134 0.147
Hansen J . 3.799 6.083 12.64
Hansen J p-value . 0.434 0.193 0.245
K-P Weak Id. F . 29.97 10.70 10.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=247 N=19 T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. First stage regressions are presented in table 10 of appendix A.
Model (a): repetition of the estimation without instrumenting the rules index; Model (b): cluster-robust
standard errors, using the Herfindahl index, the form of fiscal governance and the district magnitude as
instruments for federal countries. For unitary countries the one time lag of these varibales is included;
Model (c): same as two but with with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey-West); Model (d): present and lagged values are used as intruments in both first stage equations,
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 8: IV regressions
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Dependent Variable IV 2SLS Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (a.I) federal (a.II) unitary (b.I) federal (b.II) unitary (c.I) federal (c.II) unitary
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) -0.267** 0.316** -0.259** 0.291** -0.238** 0.321**
(0.110) (0.136) (0.108) (0.131) (0.119) (0.142)
Fiscal rules
rules -0.027 -0.091*** -0.031 -0.085*** -0.043 -0.093***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.036) (0.028)
Controls
def cg rev 0.162*** 0.028 0.159*** 0.029 0.155*** 0.028
(0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (0.052) (0.049) (0.051)
edec 0.376* 0.021 0.378* 0.028 0.381* 0.020
(0.227) (0.101) (0.226) (0.102) (0.223) (0.102)
intexp rev -0.011 0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.009 0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
outgap 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001 0.017*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
unempl 1.262*** -0.318 1.287*** -0.309 1.347*** -0.319
(0.290) (0.238) (0.294) (0.238) (0.322) (0.238)
ln pop tot 1.113*** 0.238 1.115*** 0.240 1.119*** 0.237
(0.172) (0.239) (0.172) (0.237) (0.172) (0.239)
depratio 0.884 -0.638* 0.992 -0.658* 1.258 -0.634*
(0.823) (0.351) (0.811) (0.341) (1.053) (0.355)
trend 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluded Instruments herfgovt herfgovt herfgov(t−1)
districtt districtt district(t−1)
contractt contractt contract(t−1)
herfgov(t−1)
district(t−1)
contract(t−1)
R-squared 0.623 0.235 0.624 0.246 0.623 0.232
Hansen J 6.180 2.149 0.822 0.118 0.919 1.452
Hansen J p-value 0.289 0.828 0.663 0.943 0.632 0.484
K-P Weak Id. F 7.491 8.637 14.08 7.975 4.680 16.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, n=104/143 N=8/11 (federal/unitary) T=14
Notes: Two stage least square estimations. First stage regressions are presented in table 13 of appendix
A. Separate regressions for federal (a)/(c)/(e) and unitary (b)/(d)/(f) countries. Model (a)/(b): Actual
and lagged instruments; Model (c)/(d): only actual instruments; Model (e)/(f): only lagged instruments.
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West).
Table 9: IV regressions
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Figure 5: Effect of fiscal rules in unitary countries
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Figure 6: Effect of tax autonomy in federations
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Figure 7: Marginal effect unitary countries
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Figure 8: Marginal effect federal countries
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A. First stage regression results
Model (b) Model (c) Model (d)
Equation: rules∗ unitary federal unitary federal unitary federal
Excluded instruments
herfgov ∗ federal -0.187* 0.221*** -0.187* 0.221*** -0.168 0.067
(0.098) (0.058) (0.108) (0.073) (0.116) (0.063)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ federal -0.022 0.255***
(0.098) (0.082)
contract ∗ federal 0.119** -0.502*** 0.119*** -0.502*** 0.033 -0.447***
(0.061) (0.025) (0.046) (0.093) (0.037) (0.085)
contract(t−1) ∗ federal 0.114*** -0.053***
(0.038) (0.018)
district ∗ federal -0.000 0.007* -0.000 0.007** -0.008 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
district(t−1) ∗ federal 0.010* -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
contract ∗ unitary -0.061 0.019
(0.071) (0.022)
contract(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.265** 0.032 -0.265*** 0.032 -0.216** 0.026
(0.126) (0.025) (0.103) (0.020) (0.107) (0.018)
district ∗ unitary 0.008* 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
district(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.022*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.001 0.016*** -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
herfgov ∗ unitary -0.256 0.044
(0.175) (0.046)
herfgov(t−1) ∗ unitary -0.771*** 0.005 -0.771*** 0.005 -0.557** -0.026
(0.258) (0.025) (0.177) (0.024) (0.224) (0.039)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.083** 0.017 2.083*** 0.017 2.117*** -0.026
(0.822) (0.078) (0.668) (0.096) (0.610) (0.108)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.604* 1.839*** -0.604** 1.839*** -0.538** 1.840***
(0.338) (0.326) (0.246) (0.189) (0.243) (0.174)
def cg rev -0.047 -0.001 -0.047 -0.001 -0.093 0.016
(0.222) (0.033) (0.162) (0.044) (0.160) (0.046)
edec -0.594** 0.158 -0.594* 0.158 -0.686* 0.121
(0.260) (0.177) (0.345) (0.129) (0.354) (0.121)
intexp rev 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.011
(0.055) (0.016) (0.038) (0.014) (0.040) (0.014)
outgap 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
unempl -0.860 0.087 -0.860 0.087 -0.538 -0.147
(1.644) (0.399) (1.171) (0.274) (1.140) (0.252)
ln pop tot 0.421 0.313 0.421 0.313 0.277 0.196
(0.909) (0.459) (0.625) (0.324) (0.630) (0.312)
depratio 4.733* 0.180 4.733** 0.180 4.897** 0.388
(2.664) (0.747) (2.285) (0.546) (2.380) (0.653)
trend -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.002
(0.016) (0.005) (0.028) (0.007) (0.028) (0.009)
R-squared 0.588 0.748 0.588 0.748 0.608 0.763
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 8. Endogenous variables in the second stage
is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 10: First stage regressions I44
Equation: rules Model (a.I) Model (a.II) Model (b.I) Model (b.II) Model (c.I) Model (c.II)
Excluded instruments
herfgov 0.079 -0.260 0.168 -0.649***
(0.096) (0.170) (0.105) (0.148)
herfgov(t−1) 0.279** -0.619*** 0.242* -0.828***
(0.118) (0.229) (0.132) (0.184)
contract -0.450*** -0.067 -0.488*** -0.189**
(0.088) (0.082) (0.109) (0.091)
contract(t−1) -0.077* -0.196** -0.372*** -0.251***
(0.039) (0.097) (0.107) (0.094)
district 0.020* 0.004 0.010 0.015***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
district(t−1) -0.009 0.015*** 0.011 0.018***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Other
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 2.101*** 2.749*** 2.048***
(0.540) (0.450) (0.584)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal 1.448*** 1.445*** 1.553***
(0.302) (0.326) (0.415)
def cg rev 0.006 -0.242 -0.135 -0.190 0.043 -0.255
(0.139) (0.236) (0.154) (0.227) (0.224) (0.242)
edec 1.434* -0.812** 1.278 -0.911** 1.267 -0.787*
(0.831) (0.408) (0.852) (0.433) (1.058) (0.408)
intexp rev 0.057* -0.018 0.062* 0.022 0.086* -0.014
(0.030) (0.056) (0.034) (0.055) (0.049) (0.053)
outgap 0.016 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.047** 0.000
(0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.023) (0.008)
unempl 0.585 -1.686 2.276 -1.104 2.775 -1.864
(1.380) (1.723) (1.545) (1.457) (1.898) (1.704)
ln pop tot 1.023 0.835 1.968*** 0.257 1.490* 0.898
(0.664) (1.201) (0.706) (1.137) (0.887) (1.173)
depratio -1.038 3.185 -0.024 3.492 4.702 3.073
(4.082) (2.697) (3.286) (2.705) (5.066) (2.528)
trend 0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.002
(0.020) (0.047) (0.017) (0.044) (0.028) (0.048)
R-squared 0.846 0.729 0.831 0.686 0.772 0.722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: First stage regressions for the results presented in table 9. Endogenous variables in the second stage
is the fiscal rules index for both types of government.
Table 11: First stage regressions II
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B. Robustness check: federal specification
Dependent Variable Fixed Effects Panel Model
Deficit/Revenues (1) (2) (3)
Tax autonomy
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.195** 0.186* 0.194**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097)
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.272*** -0.309*
(0.069) (0.180)
tax(t−1) ∗ regional -0.300***
(0.076)
tax(t−1) ∗ local -0.332*
(0.174)
Fiscal rules
rules ∗ unitary -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.044***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
rules ∗ federal 0.002 0.029
(0.014) (0.023)
rules ∗ regional 0.016
(0.017)
rules ∗ local -0.019
(0.017)
Controls
def cg rev 0.076** 0.120*** 0.074**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
edec 0.214** 0.232** 0.200**
(0.087) (0.114) (0.090)
intexp rev -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
outgap -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
unempl -0.047 -0.215 -0.059
(0.209) (0.242) (0.210)
trend 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
ln pop tot 0.520*** 0.526** 0.514***
(0.167) (0.223) (0.168)
depratio -0.603* -0.668* -0.615*
(0.331) (0.392) (0.340)
Observations 247 195 247
R-squared 0.270 0.289 0.177
Number of code 19 15 19
Number of Groups 19 15 19
Number of Observations 247 195 247
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Model (a): repetition of the estimation of model (d) in table 5 for comparison; Model (b): the
local and regional level in federal countries are merged; Model (c): individual coefficients for the regional
and local level in federal countries. All standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey-West).
Table 12: Regression: Deficits under different specifications
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C. Addidtional tables
Dependent Variable Interaction Terms
Deficit/Revenues
Unitary countries
tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.380**
(0.156)
rules ∗ unitary -0.107**
(0.039)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ unitary 0.040
(0.075)
Federal countries
tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.087
(0.092)
rules ∗ federal 0.006
(0.021)
rules ∗ tax(t−1) ∗ federal -0.172**
(0.075)
Notes: Results for a regression allwong for interactions between rules and tax(t−1). Only main coefficients
reported.
Table 13: Regression: Interaction model
D. Construction of the Rules Index
The construction of the rules index follows the European Commission (2009). I adopt their
dataset and calculate the rules index for the sub-national sectors. All balanced budget rules
and debt rules applying to the sub-national sector are taken into account. All information
about the included rules are available on the webpage of the European Commission. Rules
applying to the general government sector are weighted by the respective sub-national
expenditure share in it. The indicator is the sum of each criterion, devided by the total
number of criteria. Each criteria itself is devided by the maximum score, i.e. all variables
are forced to be between zero and one.
• Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two elements
below:
• Criterion 1a: Statutory or legal base of the rule
4 is assigned for a constitutional base
3 if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility
Law)
2 if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement reached by different
general government tiers (and not enshrined in a legal act)
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1 for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government,
Minister of Finance)
• Criterion 1b: Room for setting or revising objectives
3 if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the docu-
ment underpinning the rule)
2 there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives
1 there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule
merely contains broad principles or the obligation for the government or the
relevant authority to set targets)
• Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by one point in case there is a real time
monitoring of compliance with the rule (e.g. existence of alert mechanisms in case
there is a risk of non-respect of the rule).
3 if there is a monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court of
Auditors or any other Court) or the national Parliament
2 monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assess-
ing compliance)
• Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule
3 enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court) or the
National Parliament
2 enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body
1 no specific body in charge of enforcement
• Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen
and clearly specified.
4 there are automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-
compliance
3 there is an automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the
possibility of imposing sanctions
2 the authority responsible is obliged to take corrective measures in case of non-
compliance or is obliged to present corrective proposals to Parliament or the
relevant authority
1 there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance
• Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule
3 is assigned if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-
compliance is likely to trigger a public debate
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2 for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to
invoke a public debate
1 for no or modest interest of the media
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